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Abstract
Previous research has suggested that adults are sometimes egocentric, erroneously attributing their current beliefs,
perspectives, and opinions to others. Interestingly, this egocentricity is sometimes stronger when perspective-taking
than when working from functionally identical but non-perspectival rules. Much of our knowledge of egocentric bias
comes from Level 1 perspective-taking (e.g., judging whether something is seen) and judgements made about narrated
characters or avatars rather than truly social stimuli such as another person in the same room. We tested whether adults
would be egocentric on a Level 2 perspective-taking task (judging how something appears), in which they were instructed
to indicate on a continuous colour scale the colour of an object as seen through a filter. In our first experiment, we
manipulated the participants’ knowledge of the object’s true colour. We also asked participants to judge either what the
filtered colour looked like to themselves or to another person present in the room. We found participants’ judgements
did not vary across conditions. In a second experiment, we instead manipulated how much participants knew about the
object’s colour when it was filtered. We found that participants were biased towards the true colour of the object when
making judgements about targets they could not see relative to targets they could, but that this bias disappeared when
the instruction was to imagine what the object looked like to another person. We interpret these findings as indicative
of reduced egocentricity when considering other people’s experiences of events relative to considering functionally
identical but abstract rules.
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Introduction
Although at a theoretical level we are aware that other people can have different perspectives to our own, we often
ascribe our own perspectives to others even when these
particular ascriptions are unwarranted. For example, we
sometimes find it hard to ignore what we can see when
trying to understand what someone with a more limited
visual perspective might be referring to (Apperly et al.,
2010; Keysar et al., 2003; Samuel, Roehr-Brackin, et al.,
2019); we sometimes imagine that our preferences and
opinions are shared by more people than is objectively the
case (e.g., Ross et al., 1977); and when we learn something
new, we have trouble recalling our earlier ignorance and
fail to appreciate that others might not know presently
what we did not know previously (e.g., Bernstein et al.,

2004; Hinds, 1999). This “egocentric bias,” sometimes
referred to as the “curse of knowledge,” could have farreaching implications for our ability to be objective about
the world around us (Risen & Critcher, 2011), and for our
attitudes towards and interactions with others (Birch &
Bloom, 2004).
An interesting aspect of egocentric bias is that it has
been shown to be modulated by the need to take another
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person’s perspective, a process believed to utilise “theory
of mind” (sometimes “mentalising”), our ability to understand others’ mental states (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).
At first sight this description of egocentricity may appear
obvious, since being egocentric appears to necessitate the
presence of another person’s perspective. However, egocentricity in its broadest sense concerns the intrusion of
what we know when making judgements that require us to
ignore this knowledge; this can be because we are asked to
take the perspective of another person, but it can also be
because we are asked to process what is essentially the
same information couched in other, non-perspectival
terms. In other words, we can be egocentric even when we
are not thinking about others. For example, in a common
perspective-taking paradigm known as the Director Task,
participants with full visual access to an array of items in a
grid are instructed to select items according to an avatar’s
more limited perspective, such that the instruction to select
“the top vase” might require the participant to select the
second vase down if the avatar cannot see the top vase
because of a barrier. Adults make egocentric errors both
when the task is described this way and when the task is
instead described by a functionally equivalent abstract
rule, such as “do not select items that are in front of an
occluder” (Apperly et al., 2010; Legg et al., 2017).
Interestingly, more egocentric errors are usually found on
this task in the perspective-taking condition than the rulebased one (though see below), leading some to argue that
we are more prone to egocentric errors when we act in a
social context (e.g., Apperly et al., 2010).
However, this idea that we are more egocentric when
reasoning socially/perspectivally than from rules—which
we here term the social egocentricity hypothesis——is not
universally supported. For example, adults have been
found to show equivalent egocentricity when asked to confirm how many dots on a wall an avatar sees or an arrow
“sees” (Santiesteban et al., 2015). Adults also respond at
similar speeds when judging the relative spatial positions
of objects from the perspective of a doll or a camera
(Aichhorn et al., 2006) and show a similar degree of bias
towards an object’s true location when indicating where
someone with a false belief about its location will look for
it and where a film will falsely depict that object to be
(Samuel et al., 2018). There are also cases in which making judgements based on others’ perspectives appears to
reduce egocentricity relative to nonmental reasoning. For
example, on a Director Task, participants have also been
found to make perspective-based judgements faster than
rule-based judgements, without any consequent difference
in accuracy across the two conditions (Dumontheil et al.,
2010), and adults have been shown to be both faster and
more accurate when making judgements based on agents’
false beliefs than false but nonmental states such as notes
(Cohen et al., 2015; see also Samuel, Durdevic, et al.,
2019). Support for reduced egocentricity when reasoning
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socially would be consistent in spirit with research that
posits specialised mechanisms or processes for theory of
mind and social reasoning (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Sugiyama
et al., 2002), as well as with the fluidity with which we
organise our language online to reflect shared and privileged knowledge between communication partners (Clark
& Brennan, 1991).
Interestingly, the research described above typically
involves manipulating the context of a task rather than the
answer that participants need to come to. In other words,
the manipulations are essentially instructional rather than
truly functional because, in reality, participant could opt to
perform the task in any way they like. For example, instead
of following a rule such as “ignore objects in front of
occluders,” participants could imagine another agent on the
other side of the grid and treat the task as social/perspectival. The same logic can of course be applied in reverse. The
fact that different patterns of behaviour are found despite
this apparently superficial change underlines the power of
different formulations of instructions to promote different
perspective-taking strategies, such that participants might
even be made to perform suboptimally (e.g., Apperly et al.,
2010; Presson, 1982; Samuel, Durdevic, et al., 2019; Wraga
et al., 2000; Zacks & Tversky, 2005).
In Experiment 1, we utilised this ability to elicit different strategies through instruction to test the social egocentricity hypothesis, which holds that egocentric errors
increase under social perspective-taking demands. To do
so, we gave participants a task that they could solve either
with or without perspective-taking. The aim was to test
whether simply changing the context of a task from a
social to a nonsocial one would elicit an adjustment in the
degree of egocentricity. Throughout the task, participants
saw a series of coloured discs on a screen pass under a blue
colour filter (see Figure 1). The filter altered the object’s
colour, such that yellow would appear green, and green a
bluish green. They were instructed to click on a colour
scale to indicate the filtered colour, never the true colour.
Participants always saw this filtered colour on every trial.
We manipulated two variables. First, on one block, participants were shown the true colour of the object before and
after it moved under the filter (the Reality Seen condition),
and on another they were not (Reality Unseen). This
manipulated the salience of participants’ knowledge of the
true colour of the object. We reasoned that being shown the
true colour would increase the likelihood of egocentric
intrusion, “pulling” responses closer to the yellow end of
the colour response scale. Note that the participant could
ignore this information and instead focus on the filtered
colour alone if they wished to. In this sense, the manipulation is primarily contextual.
Second, we manipulated the social context of the
task. The social egocentricity hypothesis predicts that
couching the task as a social, perspectival one increases
egocentricity relative to couching the task as a simple
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Figure 1. In Experiment 1, a blue transparent filter was placed on one half of the screen laid flat in front of the participant (and
between the participant and the experimenter in the Other-Judgement condition). An L-shaped opaque barrier was placed over the
unfiltered half of the screen. On each trial, the object passed under the barrier from the unfiltered to filtered section and back again
before a colour scale appeared on the edge of the unfiltered side of the screen. In the Self-Judgement condition, the participant
performed the task alone (the experimenter left the room) and in the Other-Judgement condition the experimenter sat opposite
the participant and could only see the object through the filter. Participants were instructed to click on the scale according to
either the colour the object appeared to them under the filter (Self-Judgement condition) or the colour the object appeared to the
experimenter under the filter (Other-Judgement condition). In the Reality Seen condition, participants saw the full trajectory of the
object prior to making their response. In the Reality Unseen condition, a covering/occluder was placed over the unfiltered section
of screen, and thus the participant only saw the object through the filter.

perception task. To test this, participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups. In the SelfJudgement group, participants performed the task alone
in the room and the instruction was always to indicate
the colour that the participant herself had just seen
through the filter. In the Other-Judgement group, the
instruction was always to indicate which colour the
experimenter—present throughout both blocks of the
task— had just seen through the filter. Note that this
change was again entirely contextual—participants
could always rely on what they themselves had just
seen if they chose to do so.
Our design was also aimed at tackling two important
issues in some of the perspective-taking literature to date.
First, we cannot always be certain that participants’
behaviour in the ostensibly “social” contexts is necessarily being guided by an understanding of another’s perspective. That is, although investigating participants’
perspective-taking behaviour in the context of avatars,
dolls, and such provides an insight into strategies by
which we might take actual people’s perspectives in real
life, experimental conditions such as these may not represent the typical way in which we do so. There is a great

deal of evidence to suggest that adults behave qualitatively differently in the presence of an actual human
agent (i.e., with the potential for social interaction) rather
than when faced with a depiction or simulation of one,
such as avoiding eye contact with real people but making
eye contact with depictions of them on a screen (see
Skarratt et al., 2012, for a review). It could be that the
salience of our egocentric viewpoint is modulated by precisely how social a supposedly social stimulus (in a psychology experiment) might actually be perceived to be.
Given that reasoning about other people around us is the
most naturalistic case, we investigated the social egocentricity hypothesis with a task in which participants were
instructed to perform the task by judging how an object
appeared either to themselves or to another person in the
room.
A second issue concerns the type of perspective that
participants are instructed to take. An important distinction
has been drawn between understanding whether someone
perceives something (i.e., Level 1 perspective-taking) and
understanding how things appear (Level 2 perspectivetaking; e.g., how a 6 can appear to be a 9 depending on
where you are in relation to it; Flavell et al., 1981;
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Masangkay et al., 1974). Level 2 perspective-taking is
usually regarded as a better test of the ability to represent
other people’s mental states, since understanding how
something appears is more likely to require an understanding of another’s actual experience. In contrast, understanding whether something is perceived is a computation that
can be achieved through lower level processes such as
reading someone’s external behaviour and reasoning geometrically or spatially (Heyes, 2014; Michelon & Zacks,
2006). In our experiment, the task was not to judge whether
something was or was not visible to the other agent (it
always was), but rather to make a judgement based on
object appearance.
In sum, we hypothesised that participants would indicate colours closer to the object’s true colour when they
were shown the object unfiltered just before they made
their response (Reality Seen) compared with when the
true colour was hidden on that trial (Reality Unseen).
Given the discrepancies in the literature, we were more
open-minded as to the direction of any effect of perspective-taking on egocentricity. However, given that our
experiment was primarily about visual perspective-taking, and experiments that have tended to show greater
egocentric bias in social contexts have usually involved
visual perspective-taking rather than, for example, belief
reasoning, we tentatively hypothesised in line with the
social egocentricity hypothesis that there would be greater
egocentric bias in the Other-Judgement than SelfJudgement condition.

Experiment 1
Method
Participants. A total of 40 participants, all UK nationals,
were recruited in exchange for financial compensation.
All participants gave informed consent and the study was
approved by the University of Cambridge Psychology
research ethics committee (PRE.2015.085). None of the
participants showed signs of colour-blindness when
tested with the City University Colour Vision test (3rd
Edition). The data from two participants were later
removed for evidence of having ignored the filtered (target) colour on the scale throughout the experiment,
instead consistently (and accurately) indicating the true
colour of the object. The final sample was thus 38 participants (Mage = 21.7 years, range = 18–36, males = 13), 19 in
the Self-Judgement group and 19 in the Other-Judgement
group. Participants were debriefed following the
experiment.
Materials and procedure. Participants performed a colour
judgement task in which they had to indicate the colour of
an object (a disc on a screen) as seen through a blue colour
filter. Participants were randomly assigned to judgements
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about how they perceived the object (Self-Judgement
condition) or how another perceived the object (OtherJudgement condition). Within each group, the task varied
based on whether participants were allowed to see the
object’s true (i.e., unfiltered) colour immediately prior to
making their response or not. Before the experiment participants were familiarised with the effect of a colour filter
through observing videos of each of the 12 different-coloured disc used in the experiment moving behind the colour filter.
In the colour judgement task, the participant sat in a
darkened room with a 24-in. screen laid flat (horizontally)
in front of them. A blue transparent colour correction light
gel filter covered one half of the screen (the half on the
participant’s right—see Figure 1). In the Other Judgement
condition, the other agent (the experimenter) sat opposite
the participant but could only see the filtered section of the
screen. Participants in the Other-Judgement condition
were shown the agent’s restricted view prior to the experiment to make clear that only the participant could see the
object unfiltered. In the Self-Judgement condition, participants performed the task alone. In both conditions, participants were instructed to watch videos in which a disc
moved fluidly from the left unfiltered section to the right
filtered section and back again. The disc spent an equivalent time on the left (5 s) and right side (5 s) of the screen
during the videos.
All participants (whether in the self- or other-perspective groups) performed two blocks, order counterbalanced
across participants. In the Reality Unseen block, the unfiltered section of the screen was covered so the participant
only saw the object when it appeared through the filter. In
the Reality Seen block, the participants saw the full trajectory of the object. Within each block 12 videos were
repeated twice in randomised order to create 24 trials per
block. Twelve 10-s videos were created for the experiment
by generating a “yellow” object (RGB = 255, 242, 0) and
“green” object (RGB = 0, 196, 100) and using a colour
blender (www.meyerweb.com) to create 10 even steps
between them (see Supplementary Material for full stimulus RGB coordinates). The discs therefore ranged from
yellow to green in real colour, and hence from green to
blueish-green when viewed through the blue filter used in
the experiment.
At the end of each video and after the object had disappeared, participants were instructed to click on a
response scale to indicate the colour that best represented
either the colour of the circle as it had appeared to them
through the colour filter (Self-Judgement) or how the circle would have appeared to the experimenter1 (OtherJudgement).
The response scale was always seen unfiltered. This
judgement was made using a vertical 24-tile response scale
that included 12 tiles reflecting the full range of the real
colours of the discs in the experiment as well as an
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Figure 2. Condition means with standard error bars, for Experiments 1 (left panel) and 2 (right panel). Lower values on the scale
indicate judgements closer to the true (unfiltered) stimulus colour, and hence a response closer to the actual colour of the object.

additional 12 tiles that were a continuation of these steps in
colour towards the blue end of the colour spectrum
(RGB = 0, 142, 199). These steps can be seen on the horizontal axis on the graphs in Figure 3. On half the trials the
scale ran from yellow (top) to blue (bottom), on the other
half the orientation of the scale was reversed. On each trial
participant responses to the scale were recorded based on
the vertical location (in pixels) that they had clicked on the
scale.

Results
Initial analyses found that the data from one variable
(Reality Unseen in the Other-Judgement condition) deviated from normality (Shapiro–Wilk test, p = .047), and the
others did not (ps > .2). A log transformation did not
change this pattern of results. We therefore proceeded with
parametric testing but cross-referenced these with parallel,
nonparametric tests. The order in which participants performed the task (Reality Unseen first or Reality Seen first)
had no significant effect on performance, either in terms of
a main effect of Order or in interaction with this (all
ps > .09). We thus collapsed over this factor in our main
analyses.
The condition means are displayed in Figure 2 (left
panel). Participants in the Other-Judgement condition indicated points on the scale for the Reality Seen (M = 237,
95% confidence interval [CI] = [231, 243]) and Reality
Unseen (M = 236, 95% CI = [231, 241]) blocks that were
only one pixel apart. In the Self-Judgement condition,
there was only a two-pixel difference between Reality

Seen (M = 240, 95% CI = [233, 246]) and Reality Unseen
(M = 238, 95% CI = [232, 243]).
The means broken down by each of the 12 tiles are displayed in Figure 3. Visual inspection of the results suggests the altering effect of the colour filter was strongest
for yellows and weakest for greens, and that different types
of yellow were perceived similarly when seen through the
filter. Nevertheless, the graph gave no visual indication of
any differences between conditions.
We conducted a 2: Condition (Other-Judgement vs. SelfJudgement) × 2: Knowledge (Reality Unseen vs. Reality
Seen) mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
repeated measures over the last factor. The analysis found
no main effect of Knowledge, F(1, 36) = 0.892, mean
square of the error (MSE) = 44.216, p = .351, η2p = .024, or
Condition, F(1, 36) = 0.331, MSE = 264.668, p = .569,
η2p = .009, and no interaction, F(1, 36) = 0.106, MSE = 4.708,
p = .746, η2p = .003. The absence of a statistical difference
between the two Knowledge conditions in the OtherJudgement condition was also supported by a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test, U = 86, Z = .362, p = .717.
This highly consistent performance across both the Reality
Seen and Reality Unseen conditions, coupled with the
absence of any interaction with Condition, suggests consistency in participants’ judgements of the filtered objects’ colour regardless of whether they were reminded of its true
colour or not, and regardless of whether they were making
judgements from their own perspective or the perspective of
another person.
Given the absence of any statistically significant effects,
we conducted a test of the strength of the null hypotheses
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Figure 3. Condition means with 95% confidence intervals (Experiment 1). When unfiltered, Tile 1 represents a prototypical
yellow and Tile 12 a prototypical green. Each horizontal line on the Y axis represents the border of a tile on the response scale.

that (a) seeing the true colour of the object (Reality Seen)
does not cause performance to vary relative to when the
true colour of the object is occluded (Reality Unseen) and
(b) taking another’s perspective (Other-Judgement condition) rather than one’s own (Self-Judgement condition) has
no effect of performance. To do so, we ran a Bayesian
analysis of the ANOVA (Condition × Knowledge). We
adopted Dienes’ (2014) suggestion that meaningful support for a null result is data that is at least three times as
likely under the null than alternative hypothesis. The analysis found that the absence of a main effect of Knowledge
was four times more likely under the null (BF10 = 0.258),
and the absence of a significant interaction with Condition
was approximately nine times more likely under the null
(BF10 = 0.117). In addition, the absence of a main effect
of Condition was almost three times as likely under the
null (BF10 = 0.364). In sum, both null hypotheses were
supported.

Discussion
In Experiment 1, we gave participants a task in which
they were required to judge the apparent colour of an
object as seen through a blue colour filter. On half of the
trials, the participant saw the object’s true (unfiltered) colour immediately before responding, and on the other half
they did not. In addition, half the participants were asked
to make judgements about the object’s apparent colour
from their own perspective, and the other half were asked
to make the same judgements from the perspective of
another person.

Contrary to both our predictions, we found no statistical
difference in performance according to whether participants were reminded of the object’s unfiltered colour, or
according to whether they took the other person’s perspective or their own. The consistency of responses across both
groups and both conditions is particularly noteworthy.
Across both the Self-Judgement/Other-Judgement and
Reality Seen/Unseen comparisons, the mean response in
one condition was always located within 16 pixels (the
width of one tile) of the matched trial in the other condition. Together with the support for the null hypothesis
from the Bayesian analyses, the evidence suggests that
young adults’ judgements of the apparent colour of an
object are not influenced by their own knowledge of that
object’s true colour, nor by the instruction to take another’s
perspective instead of their own. The social egocentricity
hypothesis was not supported.
The finding that the manipulation of the salience of the
object’s true colour did not interfere with performance is
perhaps explained by the ability of participants to effectively ignore that information. In other words, participants
may have simply restricted their attention to the target
while it was filtered. The second outcome, concerning the
absence of a difference between the social- and nonsocial
contexts of the task, was more unexpected. Recall that previous research with (for example) the Director Task and
false belief tasks had found systematic differences in performance simply by altering the context that the task was
set in (Apperly et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2015; Legg et al.,
2017; Samuel, Durdevic, et al., 2019). For example, in the
Director Task, the switch between social and rule-based

1374

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 73(9)

Figure 4. In Experiment 2, participants made judgements about targets they could see (Target Seen condition) or could not see
(Target Unseen). Unlike Experiment 1, the object’s true colour was never hidden. Participants in the Perspective-Taking group were
instructed to indicate what colour the other participant saw through the filter in the Target Unseen condition.

performance could be the presence versus absence of a
humanoid avatar and the wording of instructions, just as in
our study. In false belief tasks, the difference is often an
even more limited adjustment, based exclusively on the
text of the instruction. It may be that either one or both of
(a) using a real human agent and/or (b) employing a Level
2 perspective-taking task means that participants perform
the same way regardless of the social (or otherwise) context of the task. Alternatively, it could be that the task was
not sensitive enough to detect any modulations of egocentricity, or the social context was made less social by the use
of the experimenter rather than a truly naïve agent.
We conducted a second experiment to address these
issues. In it we changed the design such that rather than
hiding the true colour of the object on half the trials, we
now hid the target (filtered) colour behind a barrier for
half the task. This created a Target Seen block and Target
Unseen block (see Figure 4), the order of which was
counterbalanced such that half received the Target Seen
block first. The object’s true colour was now always displayed immediately prior to participants’ responses (in a
sense, the entire experiment was now in the “Reality
Seen” context). If participants are biased by their knowledge of reality, then this bias should be more likely to
intrude when judgements are being made under the
increased level of uncertainty in the Target Unseen block.
In this block, participants had no perceptual access to the
filtered colour and therefore had to rely on their own

understanding of how the filter had altered the object’s
true colour, based on the same familiarisation phase at the
beginning of the task as in Experiment 1. This new manipulation also allowed us to speak to a second and related
concern, namely that we may not have found bias simply
because the task was too easy. By removing from view
the very target participants had to think about, it was
now impossible in the Target Unseen block to rely on
one’s recent perceptual experience.
As in Experiment 1, one half of the participants performed the task alone and were instructed to make judgements based on their own reasoning. The other half of the
participants performed the Target Unseen block with
another agent and were instructed to indicate the colour
that agent saw through the filter. Note that this time the
participant herself did not see the colour through the filter on these trials, only the other agent. This time, instead
of the experimenter we recruited a second and naïve participant to be the observer. Although the issue of observer
naivety is usually considered important for tasks in which
a confederate is engaged in language-use with a naïve
participant (Kuhlen & Brennan, 2013), some theories of
egocentric biases posit that they might arise only when
considering a more naïve or ignorant other (Birch &
Bloom, 2004). This manipulation eliminated the possibility that participants did not show greater bias in the social
context simply because of the type of agent they were
reasoning about.
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Finally, we preregistered our methods and analyses for
Experiment 2: https://osf.io/65dsb/register/5,771ca429ad5
a1020de2872e. Our primary hypothesis was again in line
with the social egocentricity hypothesis, namely that participants should indicate colours closer to the object’s true
colour when asked to take the perspective of a naïve
agent; in other words, a social context would promote
more egocentric responses. We set as evidence for this
hypothesis a statistically significant interaction between
Group (Perspective Taking vs. No Perspective-Taking)2
and Target (Target Seen vs. Target Unseen), favouring
judgements closer to the true colour in the Target Unseen,
Perspective-Taking condition than in the Target Unseen,
No Perspective-Taking condition. If an interaction should
not be found, then there should at least be a main effect of
Target, such that participants should indicate colours closer
to the true colour when the target was hidden by a barrier
compared with when it was visible. This would indicate
that the task was sensitive enough to elicit modulations in
egocentricity, should no evidence of any effect of perspective-taking be found.

Experiment 2
Method
Except where indicated, the procedure for Experiment 2
was the same as for Experiment 1.
Participants. A power analysis using G*Power indicated
that two groups of 23 participants were required for an
90% chance to detect an interaction of medium effect
size, assuming a correlation between variables of .5. Eligibility requirements were the same as for Experiment 1.
The No Perspective-Taking group consisted of 223 individuals (Mage = 24.6 years, range = 18–35, males = 6),
and the Perspective-Taking group consisted of 23 individuals (Mage = 21.9 years, range = 18–30, males = 6, nonbinary = 1). We also recruited 23 additional (British)
participants to act as observers only (Mage = 24 years,
range = 18–41, males = 5). In all other respects, Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1.
Materials and procedure. All participants performed one
block in which the target (the filtered object that they were
making judgements about) was visible (Target Seen), and
one block when it was occluded (Target Unseen). As before,
block order was counterbalanced across participants such
that half performed the Target Seen block first. Participants
in the No Perspective-Taking group were instructed to indicate on the same scale as before the colour of the object
through the filter, on both blocks. The participants in the
Perspective-Taking group performed the Target Unseen
condition differently. For this block, a second (observer)
participant entered the lab and was instructed to watch the
object when it was visible (i.e., when it was filtered). The
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main participant was instructed to indicate the colour of the
object that the other person saw. The observer participant
was also a British national and had not met the main participant prior to the task.
As in Experiment 1, participants watched each of the 12
videos (one per colour) once with full visibility prior to
starting the first experimental block. This was necessary
for participants to see how the filter altered the colour of
the object. The observer participants were never present
during this phase and never saw the disc except when it
was filtered.

Results
The condition means are displayed in Figure 2 (right
panel). Data were normally distributed, and we therefore
proceeded with a 2: Group (No Perspective-Taking vs.
Perspective-Taking) × 2: Target (Target Seen vs. Target
Unseen) mixed-design ANOVA. The order in which participants performed the task (Target Unseen first or Target
Unseen first) showed an influence on performance, with
responses on average 14 pixels closer to yellow across the
task as a whole if the Target Seen block was performed
first (M = 242) than second (M = 256; p = .029). Crucially
however the factor Order did not interact with either the
factor Target (Target Seen vs. Target Unseen), or the factor
Group (No perspective-Taking vs. Perspective-Taking),
nor was there any three-way interaction (all ps > .13). We
thus collapsed over this factor in our main analyses.
The analysis yielded no main effect of Target, F(1,
2
43) = 1.368, MSE = 448.655, p = .249, ηp = .031; participants were not more likely to judge hidden targets as closer
to the object’s real colour (M = 246, 95% CI = [237, 255])
than visible targets (M = 251, 95% CI = [244, 258]). There
was also no main effect of Group, F(1, 43) = 0.988,
2
MSE = 976.372, p = .326, ηp = .022; participants in the
Perspective-Taking group were not more likely to judge
occluded targets as closer to the object’s real colour
(M = 252, 95% CI = [243, 261]) than participants in the No
Perspective-Taking group (M = 245, 95% CI = [236, 255]).
However, as we had hypothesised there was indeed a significant interaction, F(1, 43) = 5.624, MSE = 448.655,
p = .022, η2p = .116, but it was not in the expected direction.
Instead, the interaction suggested that judgements were
closer to the object’s true colour in the No PerspectiveTaking group in the Target Unseen condition. In other
words, participants were less egocentric when judging the
colour the other agent saw relative to simply imagining for
themselves what the hidden filtered colour was.
We examined this interaction by means of two post hoc
paired sample t tests (Bonferroni-corrected), comparing
judgements in the Target Seen and Target Unseen condition. Participants in the No Perspective-Taking group
indicated judgements closer to the object’s true colour
when the target was occluded than when it was visible,
with a medium effect size, MDiff = 16, 95% CI = [4, 28],
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Figure 5. Condition means with 95% confidence intervals (Experiment 2). When unfiltered, Tile 1 represents a prototypical
yellow and Tile 12 a prototypical green. Each horizontal line on the Y axis represents the border of a tile on the response scale.

t(21) = 2.724, adjusted p = .026, d = 0.581, but participants
in the Perspective-Taking group did not, MDiff = –5, 95%
CI = [–19, 9], t(22) = 0.796, adjusted p = .870, d = 0.166. In
this latter group, Bayesian analyses found that the data
were 7.5 times more likely under the null that participants
did not indicate colours closer to the true colour when
perspective-taking than when not (BF10 = 0.132). In contrast, the statistically significant effect in the No
Perspective-Taking group was eight times more likely
under the alternative than the null (BF10 = 8.073).
The means broken down by each of the 12 tiles are displayed in Figure 5. Looking at these means individually,
participants in the Perspective-Taking group indicated colours closer to the true object colour in the Target Unseen
than in the Target Seen conditions for five of the 12 colours. These were the four yellowest colours and the greenest colour. In contrast, in the No Perspective-Taking group,
bias towards the true colour was greater for 11 out of the
12 colours (the sole exception being the sixth colour on the
scale, approximately half-way between yellow and green).
This pattern suggested that the finding of greater bias in
the No Perspective-Taking group was not the result of a
minority of outlying data points but rather an almost 100%
consistent pattern.

Discussion
In Experiment 2, we hypothesised (again, in line with the
social egocentricity hypothesis) that participants would be
more egocentric when perspective-taking than when working out for themselves what the hidden colour would be.

This should have been indexed by an interaction, finding
judgements closer to the true colour of the object in the
Target Unseen, Perspective-Taking condition than in the
Target Unseen, No Perspective-Taking condition. What we
found, however, was an interaction and subsequent followup tests that suggested the opposite; employing a barrier to
hide the target colour from the participant did increase
egocentricity but only when participants performed alone.
In sum, our results not only failed to support the social
egocentricity hypothesis, they patterned in the reverse;
participants showed evidence of resistance to egocentric
bias when imagining another’s perspective.
Overall, the results of Experiment 2 suggest an important difference in the degree of egocentric intrusion when
making judgements that are social or perspectival in their
format relative to judgements that are essentially about
logical reasoning (working out what a filter has done to a
colour): imagining what another person sees appears to
have the effect of helping overcome egocentricity.

General discussion
Over two experiments we gave participants a task in
which they were required to ignore an object’s true colour
and instead judge its apparent colour as seen through a
blue colour filter. In Experiment 1, half the participants
were asked to make judgements from their own perspective, and the other half were asked to make judgements
from the perspective of another person in the room. We
hypothesised that participants would be more likely to
indicate colours closer to the object’s true, unfiltered
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colour when they were reminded of this colour just prior
to responding. We found no evidence to support this
hypothesis; mean judgements were approximately equivalent across both conditions. We also hypothesised—in
accordance with the social egocentricity hypothesis—that
participants might indicate colours closer to the true colour of the object when they were asked to take another
person’s perspective instead of their own. Again, we
found no evidence that participants’ judgements varied
according to the type of instruction they received. In
Experiment 2, a new group of participants made judgements about the same stimuli, but this time the target
object was sometimes occluded, meaning participants had
to infer the filtered colour from their view of its true colour. In addition, instead of making judgements about what
the experimenter saw, a naïve second participant was
introduced for the perspective-taking block of trials. We
reasoned these manipulations would provide more fertile
ground for egocentric biases to arise. Those participants
who performed the task on their own showed an increase
in egocentricity when the target was hidden compared
with when it was visible. However, participants who were
asked to take another’s participant’s perspective showed
no such difference. This outcome was contrary to our tentative hypothesis that egocentric bias would increase
when perspective-taking.
Overall, across two experiments participants did not
show any difference in their ability to ignore an object’s
true colour when making a judgement about its filtered
colour, so long as those judgements were couched in a
social, perspective-taking context. In the first experiment,
we cannot be certain that this was not due to the simplicity
of the task creating a ceiling effect, whereby participants
ignored the true colour of the object and responded based
on what they themselves saw throughout. However, in the
second experiment we can rule out this possibility because
egocentricity did vary in the nonsocial version of the task
once we blocked the target object from view. The difference in performance was not trivial (a medium effect size
according to Cohen’s conventions). Taken together, we
interpret this finding as suggesting that making appearance
judgements about objects can elicit stronger egocentric
biases under particularly demanding conditions (such as
when the object being judged is not visually accessible),
but that performing the task perspectivally rather than nonperspectivally serves to reduce or eliminate this added
difficulty.
Our findings therefore appear more consistent with
theories that treat reasoning about others’ mental states as
the outcomes of a specialised cognitive mechanism for
social reasoning (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Sugiyama et al.,
2002), or research that suggests more efficient processing
of social than nonsocial representations (Cohen et al.,
2015; Samuel, Durdevic, et al., 2019). We do not claim,
however, that our results provide direct evidence for either.
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It is equally likely, for example, that we are less biased
when perspective-taking because we are simply more
practiced at imagining what others see rather than what
colour filters do to objects. Instead, we prefer a more conservative interpretation, namely that when more than one
strategy is available when making judgements about visual
appearances, we are less susceptible to egocentric intrusion when we adopt a perspective-taking strategy.
Our findings offer a potential explanation for the fluctuations in egocentricity in other tasks in the literature.
Recall that previous research using the Director Task—
also a visual perspective-taking task—has usually supported the possibility that social reasoning should increase
egocentricity relative to following functionally identical
but non-perspectival rules (Apperly et al., 2010; Legg
et al., 2017). Our results found the opposite. There are a
number of possible reasons why this might be the case,
because our design differed from the Director Task in a
number of important ways, and any one or combination of
these might have resulted in this reverse pattern. To take
only three examples: (a) we used a real human agent
instead of an avatar, (b) our task did not involve locating
targets referred to linguistically, and (c) participants were
only ever presented with a single object at a time rather
than an array. As there are not any empirically established
reasons to believe that these contrasts necessarily modulate egocentric biases in any reliable manner or any particular direction, it would be interesting for future research
to begin to tackle precisely these questions so that we
might be able to develop clearer explanations for differing
patterns of egocentric bias across different methodologies.
Given the present paucity of such data and the novelty of
our own methodology, we do not see our findings as contradicting outcomes from paradigms such as these owing
to the clear differences between them.
We also cannot from our data draw any direct comparisons between performance with real human agents and
simulations or depictions of agents such as avatars and
dolls, and so we are only capable of speculating upon how
the type of agent might influence performance on the comparison of a real human agent versus no agent at all. We
might speculate, for example, that reasoning about other
people reduces bias while reasoning about simulations of
people or nonhuman entities might sometimes increase it.
This could explain why egocentricity tends to rise or efficiency decrease when we make judgements about nonmental representations such as photos, notes, or maps, or
base our judgements on avatars rather than people. Such
an argument clearly has an intuitive appeal, as it would
appear unlikely that humans should have evolved to have
the greatest difficulty in reducing egocentricity when
working in the most “naturalistic” context. However, it is
important to highlight that the wider literature on perspective-taking does not support a simple linear pattern of egocentricity reducing to zero the more “human” the other
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agent is. For example, perspective-taking with real human
others certainly does not guarantee the elimination of egocentricity (Keysar et al., 2003; Mozuraitis et al., 2015,
2018; Wardlow, 2013; Wu & Keysar, 2007), and as
described earlier, similar performance has been found
when participants were asked to take the visual perspectives of dolls and inanimate objects such as cameras
(Aichhorn et al., 2006) and even asterisks (Michelon &
Zacks, 2006). These findings are spread over a number of
different task types and methodologies, and an interesting
question for future research would be to attempt to disentangle the various effects of the type of agent being reasoned about (human through to inanimate object), the form
of the perspective (Level 1 vs. Level 2), and the task
demands (e.g., primarily visual or primarily referential) to
try to develop a more general account of egocentricity.
Regardless of the accuracy or otherwise of such speculations (which only further research can be in a position to
judge), we were specifically concerned with the processing of other people’s perspectives, and in that sense we feel
our paradigm speaks to the particular issue of social/perspectival versus asocial/rule-based reasoning. In sum, our
data suggest that when making judgements about the visual appearance of an object, a pattern of reduced egocentricity might occur when participants are performing the
task as a perspective-taking task about a real and present
human other relative to an asocial and non-perspectival
context.
It is important to highlight the similarities and differences between our task and other tasks that look at egocentric biases and perspective-taking. One anonymous
reviewer pointed out that at no point in our study was there
a conflict between what the participant’s response should
be and what the other agent’s response should be. For
example, in the Director Task, the instruction to select the
“top cup” will, on critical trials, require a different response
depending on viewpoint. A self-perspective response when
the task was to take the other perspective is a clear indication of a failure to take perspectives and a reliance instead
on what the participant herself sees. In our study, the correct answer was always the same filtered colour regardless
of perspective, and as a result we may not know which
perspective participants made responses from, with consequences for our interpretations of egocentric bias. We
agree with this characterisation of our study up to a point—
there was no conflict between self and other perspectives
in our study, which is unorthodox. However, this does not
mean that participants could not demonstrate egocentricity. Overall, our measure of egocentricity came not from a
privileged perspective vis-à-vis another agent, but rather
privileged knowledge about the object that was the focus
of the task. The crucial question concerned whether such
bias would vary as a function of the way the task was
framed.
Another point raised by an anonymous reviewer concerned whether the mere presence of the other agent might
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have elicited a different strategy in participants, independently of the instruction to take that agent’s perspective.
There was no evidence, however, that responses changed as
a function of either the presence of an agent or the instruction to take that agent’s perspective. This is indicated by the
absence of a main effect of or interaction with Group in
Experiment 1, and the absence of an effect of condition in
the Perspective-Taking group in Experiment 2. Moreover,
given that we explicitly instructed participants to take the
agent’s perspective, not just to remain aware that there was
another agent present in the room, and that the agent could
not observe the participant’s responses on the colour scale
in any case, it is to our minds more likely that the attenuation of egocentric bias in Experiment 2 was due to perspective-taking specifically. Nevertheless, it is very difficult
with our data to separate any effect of the agent’s presence
from the instruction to take that agent’s perspective, as the
two always co-occurred, and we cannot definitively rule
this possibility out.
The contrast between performance while perspectivetaking relative to performance while not perspective-taking is also relatively uncommon in the literature, but was
the principal focus of the present research. This contrast is
not the same as comparing perspective-taking with avatars and nonsocial but still essentially perspective-based
control stimuli like arrows or cameras, because reasoning
about the effect of a filter has an abstract and spatially
“adirectional” quality that is not shared by such stimuli. In
our view, our task therefore has no true analogue in the
literature, but is probably most closely aligned with those
versions of the Director Task which have contrasted perspective-taking with an avatar and a rule-based control
(Apperly et al., 2010; Dumontheil et al., 2010; Legg et al.,
2017). This is in no way a comment on the value or validity of other research in the field, but simply a necessary
caveat to any interpretations of support or contradiction
when our results are considered in the light of work
focussing on Level 1 perspective-taking (Samson et al.,
2010), embodied perspective-taking (Surtees et al.,
2013b), or altercentric rather than egocentric interference (Elekes et al., 2016; Samson et al., 2010; Surtees
et al., 2016), or in the light of performance in studies with
depictions of agents rather than real human agents
(Surtees et al., 2013a, 2016).
Our results do, however, corroborate previous research
suggesting that participants can be made to engage two
different strategies—one perspectival and one not—to
arrive at what should be the same conclusion, with different behavioural outcomes as a consequence. Certainly this
was the case in Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, the task
may simply have been too easy for strategy changes to
make any difference. Overall, this pattern of experimentally manipulated strategy choice is an interesting one for
psychological research more generally, because it points
to the ability of participants to select a less efficient or less
accurate strategy among the options available to them
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simply as a result of prompting. Of course, it is very possible that participants do not know they have selected the
more biased route to an answer in our study, as the difference might be too small to detect at a conscious level. An
interesting question for future research would be to look
for this moment of conscious awareness; how strong does
our egocentric bias need to be before we become consciously aware of it?
There are two further points of interest from our results
that we feel deserve mention. First, it is important to make
clear that we do not claim that participants in our study
showed no egocentric bias at any time. Our design did not
allow the possibility to measure participants’ accuracy of
judgement because the colours seen through the filter were
not created digitally, and we did not measure these colours.
A suggestion for future research would be to utilise colour
measurement technology to measure participants “absolute” accuracy in their colour judgements. For our purposes, it was enough to test for differences in the direction
of judgements on the colour scale to establish the impact
or otherwise of varying conditions in the task. We therefore interpret our results in relative rather than absolute
terms, namely that increasing uncertainty increases egocentricity, and perspective-taking appears to eliminate this
increase.
Second, we found an irregular pattern of judgements
through the 12 colour tiles in Experiment 2, when the target
was occluded. These showed that participants from both
the No Perspective-Taking and Perspective-Taking group
indicated judgements closer to the true colour of the object
when that colour was yellow (Tiles 1 and 2), but not when
it was green. In fact, performance on green tiles varied
somewhat according to group, with the No PerspectiveTaking group displaying a fairly even incline in responses
through the green tiles, whereas the Perspective-Taking
group displayed a more pronounced shift close to what
might be considered the yellow–green category boundary.
This shift appeared to not only to reduce bias but even to
reverse it, because for some discs participants indicated
judgements further from the true colour when perspectivetaking than when not. One explanation, albeit speculative,
is that participants in the Perspective-Taking condition
made greater use of colour labels to make their judgements,
such that yellows were considered to shift categorically to
green, and greens to blue. If so, this would be a particularly
intriguing behaviour, as it would suggest that participants
perhaps engaged semantic knowledge when perspectivetaking but a different strategy when working alone. This
would not explain the full pattern of results, because both
groups showed bias on the yellowest tiles, and the No
Perspective-Taking group also showed an anomalous shift
away from “bluer” judgements on the final green tile.
Nevertheless, we suggest it might be a fruitful avenue for
future research to examine more directly the role of category labelling in perspective-taking and egocentric biases.
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Our findings serve to underline an important question
that is already being debated in the literature, namely the
merits or otherwise of drawing conclusions about how we
process others’ mental states when we are performing with
real people or simulations of them. It has already been
pointed out that we behave qualitatively differently
towards “people” when faced with a depictions of them
relative to when we are face-to-face with them (Skarratt
et al., 2012). Indeed, part of the difficulty of situating our
findings in the context of the wider literature might result
from disparate behavioural patterns depending on the type
of agent used in a task. More research with real human others as agents might be better placed to inform the study of
social reasoning in our species.

Conclusion
Taken together, we interpret the results as evidence that
adopting a perspectival strategy when judging object
appearance might reduce egocentric biases relative to a
functionally equivalent but nonsocial rule, at least under
conditions of high uncertainty.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.

Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support
for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article:
This work was supported by an ESRC grant (ES/M008460/1)
(S.S., R.L., and N.S.C.; N.S.C. is the principal investigator) and
by the European Research Council under the European Union’s
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant
Agreement No. 3399933 (A.F., N.S.C.) awarded to N.S.C.

ORCID iD
Steven Samuel

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7776-7427

Open practices
The data from the present experiment are publicly available at
the Open Science Framework website (https://osf.io/mqbr4
?show=view&view_only=). The preregistration (Experiment 2)
is available at https://osf.io/65dsb.

Supplemental material
The supplemental material is available at qjep.sagepub.com.

Notes
1.

Given that the colour filter was not computer-generated,
the stimuli as seen through the filter did not correspond
perfectly to the colours on the scale, hence the instruction
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2.

3.

to indicate which colour “best represents what the experimenter saw” or “best represents what you saw.”
We changed the group names in this experiment from SelfJudgement and Other-Judgement to No-Perspective-Taking
and Perspective-Taking because participants in the No
Perspective-Taking group did not see the target object half
the time, and hence were not always judging something they
themselves could see.
One participant’s data were later excluded as it was evident
they were consistently reporting the true colour and ignoring the effect of the filter. Including their data did not alter
the pattern of results.
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